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MCARDLE v. MISSION HOSPITAL, INC.
The disappearance of a sense of responsibility is the most far-reaching 
consequence of submission to authority.1
 The basis of a state’s authority to commit an individual to an institution against 
his or her will is based upon two legal theories: parens patriae, or the protection of 
the individual from himself or herself; and police power, the protection of society 
from the individual.2 Regardless of which theory a state uses to justify involuntary 
commitment, its primary interest when acting under such authority is “protection.”3 
Yet, in a recent decision, a North Carolina hospital escaped civil liability when it 
authorized the release of Joshua McArdle, a troubled Iraqi-war veteran, resulting in 
the serious injury of his family members and his suicide.4
 In McArdle v. Mission Hospital, Inc., the North Carolina Court of Appeals held 
that Mission Hospital was not liable for negligence to the McArdle family because 
there was no special relationship creating a duty to protect the family in the pre-
commitment stage of the involuntary commitment process.5 The court found that 
the hospital did not have custody over Joshua, thus his family could not demonstrate 
the special relationship necessary to impose liability.6
 This Case Comment contends that the North Carolina Court of Appeals erred 
in its analysis of the state’s involuntary commitment statute and failed to consider 
relevant precedent establishing the hospital as a state actor, which would have created 
the special relationship needed for the negligence case against Mission Hospital to 
proceed. By precluding hospitals from owing a duty to third parties initiating 
commitment proceedings, the McArdle court sets a dangerous precedent that allows 
state actors like Mission Hospital to escape its responsibility of protecting society, a 
duty which comes with their involuntary commitment authority.
 Joshua McArdle was a former U.S. Marine stationed in Iraq who suffered from 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and severe drug and alcohol addiction.7 
Because of his “Other than Honorable” discharge from the Marine Corps due to 
drug use in 2008, Joshua was ineligible to receive care and health services through 
the Veterans Administration (VA).8 As a result, Joshua never received any treatment 
1. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority 8 (1974). A psychologist at Yale University, Stanley 
Milgram achieved notoriety by conducting an experiment that tested the boundaries of the human 
conscience against authority. John Greenwood, How Would People Behave in Milgram’s Experiment 
Today?, Behav. Scientist (July 24, 2018), https://behavioralscientist.org/how-would-people-behave-
in-milgrams-experiment-today.
2. See Andrew Scull, The Theory and Practice of Civil Commitment, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 793, 796–97 (1984).
3. See generally Debra T. Landis, Annotation, Modern Status of Rules as to Standard of Proof Required in 
Civil Commitment Proceedings, 97 A.L.R.3d 780 (2017). 
4. McArdle v. Mission Hosp., Inc., 804 S.E.2d 214 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
5. Id. at 224.
6. Id. 
7. Id. at 216.
8. Id. 
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for his PTSD or his addictions, despite his growing paranoia and massive personal 
collection of weapons and ammunition.9
 In early May of 2013, the McArdle family gathered in Asheville, North Carolina 
to celebrate the wedding of Joshua’s sister, Seldon.10 On May 7 and 8, Joshua engaged 
in multiple violent episodes with various family members, including choking his 
brother Banning while Banning was driving, attempting to break down the door of 
his parents’ house, and attacking his brother Jacob.11 Seldon called the police, but 
Joshua left the home before the sheriff ’s deputies arrived.12 At the suggestion of one 
of the responding deputies, Arthur McArdle, Joshua’s stepfather, executed an 
Affidavit and Petition for Involuntary Commitment (the “Petition”) before the 
Buncombe County Assistance Clerk of Superior Court (the “Clerk”), seeking 
“involuntary commitment of Joshua on the grounds that he was (1) mentally ill and 
dangerous to self or others and in need of treatment . . . and (2) a substance abuser 
and dangerous to self and others.”13 Finding reasonable grounds to believe the alleged 
facts in the Petition, the Clerk issued a Findings and Custody order for Involuntary 
Commitment14 and directed the Buncombe County Sheriff ’s Department to pick up 
Joshua and transport him to Mission Hospital for an initial examination pursuant to 
North Carolina law.15 
 On May 8, the sheriff ’s department delivered Joshua to Mission Hospital, where 
nurses in the emergency department made initial observations about Joshua’s anxiety 
9. Id. (“[Joshua] abused alcohol, cocaine, Percocet, and marijuana, experienced extreme paranoia, and 
amassed a personal arsenal of weapons and ammunition.”).
10. Id. 
11. Id. 
12. Id.
13. Id.; see also N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 122C-261(a), -281(a) (2018) (prescribing that anyone with knowledge of 
a person’s mental illness or substance abuse can execute an affidavit and petition a clerk or magistrate to 
take them into custody for examination). 
14. McArdle, 804 S.E.2d at 216; see also §§ 122C-261(b), -281(b): 
If the clerk or magistrate finds reasonable grounds to believe that the facts alleged in 
the affidavit are true . . . the clerk or magistrate shall issue an order to a law enforcement 
officer or any other person authorized under G.S. 122C-251 to take the respondent into 
custody for examination by a physician or eligible psychologist. 
15. McArdle, 804 S.E.2d at 216. According to §§ 122C-263(a) and 122C-283(a):
Without unnecessary delay after assuming custody, the law enforcement officer or the 
individual designated by the clerk or magistrate under G.S. 122C-251(g) to provide 
transportation shall take the respondent to an area facility for examination by a 
physician or eligible psychologist; if a physician or eligible psychologist is not available 
in the area facility, the person designated to provide transportation shall take the 
respondent to any physician or eligible psychologist locally available. If a physician or 
eligible psychologist is not immediately available, the respondent may be temporarily 
detained in an area facility, if one is available; if an area facility is not available, the 
respondent may be detained under appropriate supervision in the respondent’s home, in 
a private hospital or a clinic, in a general hospital, or in a State facility for the mentally 
ill, but not in a jail or other penal facility.
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and threat levels.16 Dr. James Roberson, a physician for the hospital, referred Joshua 
to the hospital’s psychiatric unit for the required first examination, where he was 
eventually examined by social worker and hospital employee Dina Paul (“Paul”).17 In 
conducting interviews with Joshua, Arthur, Banning, and Jacob, Paul learned of 
Joshua’s addictions, his “Other than Honorable” discharge from the Marine Corps, 
his lack of VA benefits, and his self-acknowledged anger issues.18 Paul also learned of 
the violent physical altercation between Joshua and his brother Jacob that led to the 
filing of the Petition.19
 In her evaluation report to Dr. Roberson, Paul recommended against inpatient 
commitment for Joshua after concluding that he “can benefit from return to home 
with referral to VA for help with benefits and therapy.”20 After a discussion with 
Paul, Dr. Roberson signed the “Examination and Recommendation to Determine 
Necessity for Involuntary Commitment” form indicating that Joshua did not meet 
the criteria for inpatient commitment.21 That evening, Mission Hospital discharged 
Joshua without notifying the McArdle family, thus terminating the involuntary 
commitment proceedings.22
 Three nights after the discharge, at around 1:20 a.m., on his sister’s scheduled 
wedding day, Joshua, intoxicated and armed with a .357 Magnum revolver, broke into 
the McArdle family residence, where he shot and severely wounded Banning and 
Arthur before fatally shooting himself in the head in front of his mother and sisters.23 
The weight of his body landed on his mother’s leg, breaking it in several places.24
 On December 29, 2014, the McArdle family brought suit against defendants 
Mission Hospital, Inc. and Mission Health System, Inc. (“Defendants”) for negligence, 
gross negligence, and negligent infliction of emotional distress arising from the acts 
and omissions of Defendants’ employees in the first examination.25 Defendants filed 
their answer and a motion to dismiss, arguing that they owed no legal duty to the 
16. McArdle, 804 S.E.2d at 216. The nurses at Mission Hospital initially recorded in Joshua’s medical chart 
that he “appeared ‘Anxious’ with ‘Impaired Focus/Concentration’ and that he ‘Denies suicidal ideation/
homicidal ideation at present’ and ‘Minimizes problem[s].’” Id. at 217.
17. Id. at 217. The McArdles contend that Paul was not qualified per §§ 122C-263(a) and 122C-283(a) to 
examine Joshua, but the court never reached that issue. Id. 
18. Id.
19. See id.
20. Id. Paul’s report apparently assumed Joshua’s eligibility for VA benefits despite his “Other than 
Honorable” discharge. Id. 
21. Id. Dr. Roberson’s form stated that Joshua “was able . . . to contract for safety—denie[d] suicidal ideation 
and homicidal ideation with no psychotic symptoms,” and had “[n]o psychiatric history.” Id. The form 
failed to indicate that Joshua was “mentally ill and/or a substance abuser and dangerous to himself or 
others,” even though Arthur had expressed this concern. Id.
22. Id. 
23. Plaintiffs-Appellants’ Brief at 5–6, 12, id. (No. COA16-554).
24. Id. at 6.
25. McArdle, 804 S.E.2d at 217–18.
337
NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL LAW REVIEW VOLUME 63 | 2018/19
McArdles during or after Joshua’s examination.26 The McArdles argued that a duty to 
the McArdle family existed because a special relationship was created between 
Defendants and Joshua by virtue of Defendants’ legal right to control Joshua, thereby 
creating a legal duty to the McArdle family.27 They also noted a distinction between 
“custody” and a “legal right to control,” maintaining that Defendants ultimately had 
the “legal right to control” because they had the authority to retain Joshua by 
recommending involuntary commitment for either mental illness or substance abuse.28 
The Superior Court of North Carolina granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss, holding 
that Defendants owed the McArdles no legal duty.29 The McArdles appealed.30
 The issue of first impression before the North Carolina Court of Appeals was 
whether Defendants, in conducting the first examination of Joshua in the pre-
commitment stage, owed a legal duty to the McArdles as third parties under state 
common law or the involuntary commitment statutory scheme.31 In analyzing the 
common law rule that “there is neither a duty to control the actions of a third party, 
nor to protect another party,” the court relied largely on Scadden v. Holt, which set 
forth the exception that a duty to third parties may exist where there is a special 
relationship between the defendant and a third party, such that “(1) the defendant 
knows or should know of the third person’s violent propensities and (2) the defendant 
has the ability and opportunity to control the third person at the time of the third 
person’s criminal acts.”32 The court emphasized that the “ability and opportunity to 
control must be more than mere physical ability to control. Rather, it must rise to the 
level of custody, or legal right to control.”33
 The court had previously recognized a special relationship between healthcare 
facilities and third-party plaintiffs when “an individual is involuntarily committed, 
negligently released by the defendant, and the negligent release proximately results in 
harm . . . .”34 By contrast, the court had found no special relationship when a 
26. Id. at 218.
27. Id. at 222–23.
28. See McArdle, 804 S.E.2d at 219. 
29. Id. at 218. The Superior Court also held that no amended set of facts or circumstances would support a 
finding that Defendants owed the McArdle family a legally recognized duty. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 219.
32. 733 S.E.2d 90, 93–94 (quoting Stein v. Asheville City Bd. of Educ., 626 S.E.2d 263, 269 (N.C. 2006)). 
33. Id. at 94.
34. McArdle, 804 S.E.2d at 219; see, e.g., Gregory v. Kilbride, 565 S.E.2d 685, 690 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002) 
(“[A]n independent duty arises to protect third persons from harm by the release of a mental patient 
who is involuntarily committed.”); Davis v. N.C. Dep’t of Human Res., 465 S.E.2d 2, 7 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1995) (“Rivers was involuntarily committed into defendant’s custody and [the defendant], therefore, had 
a duty to exercise reasonable care in the protection of third parties from injury by Rivers.”); Pangburn v. 
Saad, 326 S.E.2d 365, 367–68 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985) (recognizing a duty to third parties where the 
defendant prematurely released an involuntarily-committed patient who then stabbed the plaintiff 
approximately twenty times).
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voluntarily-committed individual is released and thereafter causes harm.35 Thus, the 
issue of whether a special relationship exists during the “pre-commitment” stage of 
the involuntary commitment process was an open question.36
 The court then reviewed the statutory scheme, and although it recognized that 
the statute’s language may have imposed a duty of care on Defendants as to Joshua, 
it refused to extend that duty to the McArdle family.37 The court ultimately accepted 
Defendants’ arguments, concluding that North Carolina law does not recognize an 
affirmative duty of psychiatric care providers to seek involuntary commitment for 
individuals.38 In affirming the lower court’s decision, the court held that “the 
examiner has no discretion whether or not to release a respondent. It is the statutes 
that dictate the results based on the examiner’s findings, and the examiner is not 
authorized by law to deviate from those statutorily-imposed results.”39 The court, 
therefore, declined to extend liability to third parties in the pre-commitment stages 
of involuntary commitment proceedings for fear of having the special relationship 
exception “swallow the rule.”40
 This Case Comment contends that the North Carolina Court of Appeals erred 
in affirming the lower court’s decision to grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss. First, 
the McArdle court inappropriately examined North Carolina General Statute section 
122C through a plain meaning analysis because ambiguity existed surrounding the 
meaning of “custody,” and the court failed to resolve the ambiguity in the statute. 
Second, the court failed to consider persuasive precedent that would have established 
Defendants’ custody over Joshua through the statutory delegation of state police 
power. Finally, allowing medical professionals to escape responsibility when failing 
to protect third parties from dangerous, mentally-ill patients runs counter to societal 
values of accountability and justice.
 The court’s first error was that it failed to recognize the ambiguity of the word 
“custody” and thus incorrectly engaged in a plain meaning analysis of the statute. 
Courts are only to construe a statute by its plain meaning if there is no ambiguity.41 
When the statute’s language is susceptible to multiple interpretations, it is the court’s 
duty to determine the legislature’s intent and interpret the statute consistent with that 
35. McArdle, 804 S.E.2d at 219; see, e.g., King v. Durham Cty. Mental Health Dev. Disabilities & Substance 
Abuse Auth., 439 S.E.2d 771, 775 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (finding defendants lacked custody over a 
voluntarily-committed individual without a court order).
36. McArdle, 804 S.E.2d at 219.
37. Id. at 221–23.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 223.
40. Id. at 224. On September 19, 2018, the McArdle family filed a petition for discretionary review of the 
appellate court’s decision, but they were denied certiorari on all issues without an opinion. See McArdle 
v. Mission Hosp., Inc., 807 S.E.2d 150 (N.C. 2019).
41. Burgess v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc., 388 S.E.2d 134, 136 (N.C. 1990) (citing North Carolina ex rel. 
Util. Comm’n v. Edmisten, 232 S.E.2d 184 (N.C. 1977)).
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intent.42 To properly determine legislative intent, courts must fully consider the context 
of the ambiguous term in accordance with all provisions of the statute, with the 
understanding that no provision should be considered mere “surplusage.”43 Courts may 
also rely on dictionary definitions to determine the meaning of ambiguous terms.44
 The word “custody” is used throughout the various provisions of the North 
Carolina involuntary commitment statute. The provisions that dictate the initiation 
of involuntary commitment proceedings state that “the clerk or magistrate shall issue 
an order to a law enforcement officer or any other person authorized under G.S. 
122C-251 to take the respondent into custody for examination by a physician or 
eligible psychologist.”45 The language in the provisions discussing the first 
examination in the involuntary commitment process also refer to custody: “Without 
unnecessary delay after assuming custody, the law enforcement officer or the 
individual designated by the clerk . . . shall take the respondent to an area facility for 
examination by a physician or eligible psychologist . . . .”46 The legislature, however, 
does not define custody in the definitions provision of the statute.47 Not only is the 
term “custody” left undefined, but none of the language in any provision ever clarifies 
who is supposed to have custody over the respondent, the police or the hospital, or 
when such custody is to be transferred, rendering it ambiguous. Thus, instead of 
applying a plain meaning analysis, the court should have examined the words 
surrounding “custody” in the context of all the provisions, reviewed legislative intent, 
or consulted a dictionary in order to resolve the ambiguity. 
 Merriam-Webster defines “custody” as “immediate charge and control (as over a 
ward or a suspect) exercised by a person or an authority.”48 To further clarify this 
definition, Merriam-Webster defines “control” as “to exercise restraining or directing 
influence over.”49 Further, the words “for examination” directly follow “custody” in 
the statutory provisions governing the petition for seeking involuntary commitment.50 
42. Id. at 136–37 (citing Young v. Whitehall Co., 49 S.E.2d 797 (N.C. 1948)); see also Dickson v. Rucho, 
737 S.E.2d 362, 369–70 (N.C. 2013) (determining the legislative intent behind a North Carolina 
redistricting statute that contained ambiguous language).
43. Burgess, 388 S.E.2d at 140 (quoting Jolly v. Wright, 265 S.E.2d 135, 139 (N.C. 1980)).
44. Wind v. City of Gastonia, 738 S.E.2d 780, 785 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting Knight Publ’g Co. v. 
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 616 S.E.2d 602, 607 (N.C. Ct. App. 2005)). 
45. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 122C-261(b) (2018).
46. Id. §§ 122C-263(a), -283(a). Custody is also discussed in the transportation provision of the statute: 
“[L]aw enforcement officers, to the extent possible, shall advise respondents when taking them into 
custody that they are not under arrest and have not committed a crime, but are being transported to 
receive treatment and for their own safety and that of others.” Id. § 122C-251(c).
47. See id. § 122C-3.
48. Custody, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/custody (last visited Mar. 
23, 2019) (emphasis added).
49. Control, Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/control (last visited Mar. 
23, 2019).
50. §§ 122C-261(b), -281(b).
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These words cannot be mere surplusage—in context, it is clear that the legislature’s 
intended purpose of custody is examination, and therefore anyone performing the 
examination would have authority via statute to “exercise restraining or directing 
influence over” the respondent throughout their examination. The determination by 
the examiner in the pre-commitment stage ultimately affects whether or not someone 
being examined will be released,51 establishing custody and creating the necessary 
grounds for the special relationship, and thus a duty of care, to third parties like the 
McArdles.
 Furthermore, had the court attempted to take into consideration legislative intent 
when reviewing the statutory language, it would have found that Senate Bill 630, 
submitted to the General Assembly of North Carolina prior to the McArdle decision, 
introduced proposed revisions to the applicable statutes, further supporting the 
legislature’s intent to treat the term “custody” broadly.52 The additional language 
proposed for General Statute section 122C-261 is as follows:
No commitment examiner . . . responsible for the custody, examination, 
detention, management, supervision, treatment, or release of an individual 
examined for commitment . . . shall be held liable . . . for taking reasonable 
measures to temporarily detain an individual for the period of time necessary 
to complete a commitment examination, . . . as long as the commitment 
examiner has a reasonable and good-faith belief that detention pending the 
examination and issuance of a custody order is necessary to protect the 
individual or others from bodily harm or life endangerment.53
 The legislature clearly intended for the commitment examiner to be “responsible 
for the custody” and “detention” of the respondent, as suggested by these proposed 
changes. The changes even go so far as to shield examiners from liability for taking 
the necessary steps to prevent harm to third parties,54 an affirmative directive 
implying a pre-existing duty to third parties absent this statutory revision. Had the 
court considered the legislature’s intent as evidenced by these proposed changes, it 
would have found that Defendants did, in fact, have custody over Joshua during the 
examination in the pre-commitment stage such that a special relationship was formed 
and a legal duty f lowed to the McArdle family.
51. See §§ 122C-263(d), -283(d).
52. S. 630, 2017 Gen. Assemb., 2017–2018 Sess. (N.C. 2017), http://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2017/Bills/
Senate/PDF/S630v1.pdf. The proposal was referred to the Committee on Rules, Calendar, and 
Operations of the House on April 27, 2017, nearly three months before the McArdle court issued its 
opinion. See Senate Bill 630 / SL 2018-33, N.C. Gen. Assembly, https://www.ncleg.gov/BillLookup/2017/
S630 (last visited Feb. 24, 2019).
53. N.C. S. 630 at 33 (emphasis added). Indeed, this new version has been signed into law and takes effect 
October 1, 2019. See N.C. G.S. 122C-261(d)(8) (effective Oct. 1, 2019).
54. See N.C. S. 630. This exemption from liability applies to a commitment examiner, area facility, acute 
care hospital, general hospital, or other site of first examination, or its officials, staff, employees, or any 
individual “who follows accepted professional judgment, standards, and practice.” Id. Thus, had the 
court properly considered legislative intent, it would have needed to separately determine whether 
Defendants “follow[ed] accepted professional judgment, standards, and practice” to shield them from 
liability. See id.
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 The McArdle court’s second error was that it ignored persuasive authority 
involving involuntary commitment statutes akin to those in North Carolina. Indeed, 
other courts have recognized that first examiners have legal control over respondents 
through a statutory delegation of state police power to make a factual determination 
regarding an individual’s deprivation of personal liberty.
 In Plain v. Flicker, the United States District Court of New Jersey held that the 
state of New Jersey “delegated to physicians its police power” to deprive an individual 
of his liberty pursuant to state law, whether or not “the physicians are in private practice 
or are public employees.”55 Using a two-prong “ joint action test” for determining 
whether private action constitutes state action, the court recognized that private 
hospitals and physicians with statutory authority to examine and make a determination 
affecting a person’s liberty had such a significant level of control as to be subject to due 
process claims as state actors.56 The court equated public doctors and hospitals acting 
under authority from the involuntary commitment statutes with “state actors,” namely 
police, who have the authority to quarantine the individual in the first place.57
 Similarly, in Kay v. Benson, the United States District Court for the District of 
New Hampshire also held that a defendant physician, in issuing an emergency 
detention certificate for involuntary commitment under New Hampshire law, “was 
clothed with state authority so substantial in nature as to render his actions virtually 
identical to actions taken by the state,” upholding the due process claim against him 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.58 The court further justified its holding by explaining that 
under New Hampshire law, the state legislature delegated to private individuals the 
power to detain a person against his wishes, a power historically exercised by 
government entities that a private physician would not otherwise have.59
 Finally, in Cummings v. Charter Hospital, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that 
Nevada statutes dictating involuntary commitment procedures constitute a delegation 
of state power by authorizing private parties to restrain individuals against their will, 
an exercise of “significant power over those alleged to be mentally ill.”60 In response to 
55. 645 F. Supp. 898, 908 (D.N.J. 1986). 
56. Id. at 907–08. The two-part test for determining whether private action qualifies as state action was set 
forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 155 (1978) (“[Plaintiffs] 
are first bound to show that they have been deprived of a right ‘secured by the constitution and the laws’ 
of the United States. They must secondly show that [the defendant] deprived them of this right acting 
‘under color of any statute’ of the [state].”).
57. Plain, 645 F. Supp. at 908.
58. 472 F. Supp. 850, 851 (D.N.H. 1979).
59. Id.
60. 896 P.2d 1137, 1144–45 (Nev. 1995). Like North Carolina, Nevada’s statutes allow for private persons 
and state actors to take an individual into custody for an examination to determine whether they should 
be involuntarily committed. See Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 433A.160, .200 (West 2019). They may also 
“transport the person alleged to be a person with mental illness to a public or private mental health 
facility or hospital . . . .” Id. § 433A.160(1)(a)(2). The petition for involuntary admission may be filed by 
a “spouse, parent, adult children or legal guardian of the person to be treated or by any physician, 
physician assistant, psychologist, social worker or registered nurse, by an accredited agent of the 
Department or by any officer authorized to make arrests in the State of Nevada.” Id. § 433A.200.
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the argument that the defendants were private parties and thus could not be sued for 
denying due process, the court instructed that the “public function” test considers a 
private entity a state actor when the state grants them “powers traditionally exclusively 
reserved to the [s]tate.”61 The court concluded that the defendant hospital was “clothed 
with the authority of state law and exercised a power possessed by virtue of that law” 
when it detained the plaintiffs against their will, thus rendering them state actors.62
 Here, it is clear that the McArdle court ignored the realm of case law in which 
hospitals and physicians with state-delegated authority to control are accountable as 
state actors during the involuntary commitment process. By not considering the above 
precedent, the North Carolina Court of Appeals failed to recognize that Defendants, 
under the North Carolina involuntary commitment scheme, were delegated and 
exercised state police power to deprive Joshua of his personal liberty, and as such, had 
legal “custody” in the pre-commitment stage which created a duty to the McArdle 
family. The court acknowledged that law enforcement had custody of Joshua from the 
moment the Petition was executed by the Clerk,63 but failed to acknowledge that legal 
custody transferred to Defendants once they performed the initial examination, 
during which time they had the legal authority to exercise control over Joshua. In its 
holding, the McArdle court credited the operation of the statute itself with creating 
the responsibility of exercising control over Joshua, stating that the hospital would 
have had custody of Joshua once he was admitted under the statute.64 However, absent 
the initial examination during the pre-commitment stage, the statute fails to operate, 
and as such, the power to determine whether someone shall be involuntarily committed 
equates to substantial control and custody at that time.
 Lastly, the McArdle decision provides no minimum standards for hospitals to do 
what is necessary to protect third parties who initiate involuntary commitment 
proceedings, highlighting a gap in accountability during the pre-commitment stage. 
Medical professionals involved in the first examination have a moral and social duty 
to take all appropriate, cautionary measures to protect respondents and third parties 
when a real threat is expressed.65 A 2001 article by Alan Felthous and Claudia 
Kachigian properly characterizes a clinician’s duty to warn third parties: 
Regardless of what legal protective duties are in effect, as a rule, the most 
prudent and preventative measure to handle a patient who is seriously 
mentally ill, and as a result is dangerous to others, is hospitalization. In such 
a case, hospitalization is the most reasonable intervention regardless of 
whether the risk is generalized to anyone or specific to an identifiable victim. 
. . . If the patient refuses voluntary hospitalization, civil commitment should 
61. Cummings, 896 P.2d at 1142 (quoting Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 352 (1974)).
62. Id. at 1144–45.
63. McArdle v. Mission Hosp., Inc., 804 S.E.2d 214, 221 (N.C. Ct. App. 2017).
64. Id. at 222.
65. See generally Alan R. Felthous & Claudia Kachigian, To Warn and to Control: Two Distinct Legal 
Obligations or Variations of a Single Duty to Protect?, 19 Behav. Sci. & L. 355 (2001).
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not be avoided merely because of a possible increase in exposure to liability 
where a duty to control exists only if the patient is committed.66
 The McArdle decision overlooks society’s moral outrage when those with state 
authority fail to protect others who are at risk of being harmed.67 Hospitals that 
provide the first examination in an involuntary commitment proceeding must be 
legally required to reasonably intervene when they are made aware that a third party 
faces an imminent threat by a mentally unstable individual.68 As a result of the 
McArdle decision, no party can be held responsible for failing to heed the legitimate 
fears of those closest to the person whose commitment is sought, an outcome that is 
at odds with the sense of morality that tort law generally seeks to enforce.69
 The court should have enforced social morality by recognizing that with such 
state authority to control comes a responsibility to protect—not only the individuals 
who are being evaluated for commitment, but also third parties who initiate 
involuntary commitment proceedings. The consequences of allowing hospitals acting 
under state authority to escape responsibility will be far-reaching in its effect of 
separating law from social morality.70
66. Id. at 370.
67. See Nurit Guttman & William Harris Ressler, On Being Responsible: Ethical Issues in Appeals to Personal 
Responsibility in Health Campaigns, 6 J. Health Comm. 117, 127 (2001) (citing J. W. Douard & W. J. 
Winslade, Tarasoff and the Moral Duty to Protect the Vulnerable, in Health Care Ethics: Critical 
Issues 316 (J. F. Monagle & D. C. Thomasa eds., Aspen Publishers 1994)). 
68. See Alan R. Felthous, The Clinician’s Duty to Protect Third Parties, 22 Psychiatric Clinics of N. Am. 
49, 50 (1999).
69. See Ernest Weinrib, The Special Morality of Tort Law, 34 McGill L.J. 403, 407–10 (1989).
70. Cf. Milgram, supra note 1.
